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Unqualified Interests, Definitive Definitions:
Washington v. Glucksberg
and the Definition of Life
by ALEXA HANSEN*
Introduction
"My life, my death, my control."1  More than ten years ago, the
Supreme Court found that Washington state had an "unqualified interest"
in preserving the life of its citizens.2 Balancing the state's interests against
an individual's right to suicide, or, further, an individual's right to
physician-assisted suicide, the Court found that the state's interests were
"unquestionably important and legitimate" and "at least reasonably related"
to the statute in question. But in making this decision, and applying a
rational basis review, the Supreme Court neglected to consider what should
have been a key question: what is life and when does it end?
The Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health held that it was proper to "simply assert an unqualified interest in
the preservation of human life."4 In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court
further adopted Washington's assertion that "all persons' lives, from
beginning to end, regardless of physical or mental condition, are under the
full protection of the law."5  By refusing to specify when life ends,
however, the Court assumed its eventual conclusion: it is impossible for an
* J.D. Candidate 2009, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 2004,
Dartmouth College. I would like to thank Professor David Faigman for his guidance and support;
Katey Krizan, Ilana Richman, and Heather Bennett for access to their medical textbooks and
journals, and; Melissa Sheiko, Gwendolyn Carroll, John Nixon, and my parents for their review
and critique of early drafts.
1. Daniel Bergner, Death in the Family, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 2, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/l 2/02/magazine/O2suicide-t.html?scp=3&sq-.
2. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997).
3. Id. at 735.
4. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990).
5. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 729.
[163]
individual liberty to overcome an unqualified interest in preserving an
undefined term.
At some point, the state's interest in a person's life must end, due to
the simple fact that that person is no longer "alive." By conclusively
defining this ending point, the Court can provide a standard against which
the state's interest can be properly balanced against an individual's liberty.
An examination of biology, medicine, and currently established legal
standards of death suggest that the end of a person's life and, consequently,
the state's interest in preserving that life, should be defined as "whole brain
death." Ultimately, a bright-line definition may help individuals have
greater control over their own autonomy and set the end point of what is
inevitably a sliding scale of a state's interest.
This note will examine how the Glucksberg Court assumed its
eventual conclusion and why defining the end of life as whole brain death
can help remedy that error. Part I examines how the history of physician-
assisted suicide cases culminated in (1) the rational basis review of the
Washington law; (2) the unqualified interest in the preservation of life, and;
(3) why these two assertions suffer from inherent flaws. Part II examines
scientific and legal definitions of death and discusses why whole brain
death is the appropriate designation for the end of life. Part III provides a
hypothetical examining how using whole brain death to define the end of
life would affect the Court's analysis of the state's interest in preserving
life with regard to physician-assisted suicide. This section concludes by
discussing a few of the questions with regard to physician-assisted suicide
that this definition would be as yet unable to resolve.
I. The History of Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases
Three cases outline the development of the Court's adoption of the
state's unqualified interest in life. First, In re Quinlan, a New Jersey
Supreme Court case, examined the right of a family member to refuse
treatment on behalf of a daughter in a persistent vegetative state.6 Second,
Cruzan, a Supreme Court case, examined whether a state could set a high
evidentiary bar to prove intent of a persistent vegetative person to withdraw
treatment.7 Finally, Glucksberg, the most recent Supreme Court case,
examined whether an individual has a right to physician-assisted suicide.
8
Examining how each of these three cases shaped and created the state's
6. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 671 (N.J. 1976).
7. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 265.
8. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705-06.
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unqualified interest in life underscores the concerns and ideals courts have
grappled with to arrive at the law's current position.
A. In re Quinlan: Where It Began
In 1976, Karen Ann Quinlan, a twenty-two-year-old coma victim,
unknowingly became the center of the burgeoning right-to-die debate.9
The crux of the case centered on her father's wish to be appointed his
daughter's guardian. 10 However, Mr. Quinlan made it clear that, if granted
guardianship, he intended to remove his daughter from life support."
The court's discussion was grounded on a theoretical constitutional
right to privacy. 12 While not explicitly mentioned in the United States
Constitution, a right to privacy had been recognized in "many aspects of
personal decision[s]."' 3  The court found that "no external compelling
interest of the State could compel Karen to endure the unendurable, ' '14 and,
consequently, that the "termination of treatment pursuant to the right of
privacy is ... lawful."'
15
Although Quinlan concerned whether a person in a permanent
vegetative state or his or her guardian could refuse medical treatment, the
case is widely regarded as the "seminal discussion" addressing an
individual's right to die. 16 The Quinlan court discussed the state's interest
in the preservation of life at length. 17 Most pertinent to this discussion, the
court acknowledged "that the State's interest contra weakens and the
individual's right to privacy grows as . . . the prognosis dims."'
18
Additionally, the court noted, "[u]ltimately there comes a point at which
the individual's rights overcome the State interest."' 9
9. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 651.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 662-63.
13. Id. at 663 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
14. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663.
15. Id. at 670.
16. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990); see also PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. AND BIOMED. AND BEHAV.
RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH: A REPORT ON THE MEDICAL LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES OF THE
DETERMINATION OF DEATH 40, 61 n.8 (1981) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N], available at
http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/past-commissions/defining-death.pdf. Karen Quinlan and her
physical state are used as examples throughout this discussion.
17. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663-64.
18. Id. at 664.
19. Id.
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B. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health: An "Unqualified"
Interest?
Fourteen years later, the Supreme Court was presented with a similar
situation. 20 The parents of Nancy Beth Cruzan, an incompetent on artificial
feeding and hydration, petitioned the Court to remove her life support .
The Court denied the parents' petition, on the ground that the parents could
not show by heightened evidentiary standards that such action would be
approved of by their daughter.22
Invoking the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and
prior decisions, the Court concluded that a person does have a liberty
interest to refuse medical treatment under the Due Process Clause.23 The
Court refused to find, contrary to Quinlan, that such a right of refusal exists
under a "generalized constitutional right of privacy., 24 The Court noted
that such a right is not absolute, but must be weighed against the state's
interest.25 Although the Court noted that "[t]he choice between life and
death is a deeply personal decision,', 26 it found that a "State may properly
decline to make judgments about the 'quality' of life that a particular
individual may enjoy, and simply assert an unqualified interest in the
preservation of human life."27  The Court's analysis concluded that
Missouri's "clear and convincing evidence" standard of proof was a proper
standard.28  This standard was proper both because the "interests at
stake.. . were more [than] substantial, ' 29 and it allocated "the risk of an
30
erroneous decision" to the moving party-the parents, in this case.
20. Cruzan,491 U.S. at 261.
21. Id. at 265.
22. Id. at 281. The standard adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court was "clear and
convincing" evidence. Id. at 282.
23. Id. at 278. Two cases relied upon for this implied liberty of refusing medical treatment
included a case in which the Petitioner refused a small pox vaccine, Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905), and one in which Petitioner refused the administration of
antipsychotic medication. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990).
24. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 n.7.
25. Id. at 278. The Cruzan Court acknowledged that "Missouri relies on its interest in the
protection and preservation of human life, and there can be no gainsaying this interest." Id.
Justice Brennan further clarified that the Missouri Supreme Court found that only the state's
interest in the preservation of life was important. Id. at 314 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 281 (majority opinion).
27. Id. at 282.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 283.
30. Id.
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Cruzan presents several interesting points. First, the Court found that
an individual had a liberty interest in refusing medical treatment.31 Second,
the Court appears to have applied a heightened level of scrutiny to this
decision.32 Third, part of the direct support the Court provides for its
conclusion of an "unqualified interest in preserving human life" is a
reluctance to judge the "quality" of a human life.33  Indirectly, the Court
places great emphasis on the irreversible nature of the decision to remove
life support,3 4 which likely influenced its reluctance to define quality of
life. But the ultimate holding rested on deciding the appropriate level of
evidentiary persuasion regarding intent to permit removal of life sustaining
treatment, and not a direct examination of whether an individual had the
fundamental right to refuse such treatment. The Court's language
regarding an unqualified interest in the preservation of life was somewhat
tangential. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent,
[M]issouri has no such power to disfavor a choice by Nancy Cruzan
to avoid medical treatment, because Missouri has no legitimate
interest in providing Nancy with treatment until it is established that
this represents her choice. Just as a State may not override Nancy's
choice directly, it may not do so indirectly through the imposition of
a procedural rule.
35
If the Court's true concern was to avoid making quality of life
judgments, then not even the procedure the Court takes in deciding a case
should be influenced by a state's unqualified interest in preserving life.
31. Id. at 278.
32. Id. at 282. The "substantial" interest language indicates this heightened level of
scrutiny. Under heightened scrutiny, a statute only violates a liberty if the "incidental restrictions
on ... freedoms are greater than necessary to further a substantial governmental interest." San
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 537 (1987). Heightened
scrutiny has been reframed in other cases with slightly different language, usually in the context
of gender discrimination. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1970) (requiring that the
government interest be important); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (requiring
an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for that government action). The other two standards of
scrutiny are strict scrutiny and rational basis scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, afforded to
fundamental rights, a statute must be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest. See
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997). Under the lowest level of scrutiny, and
by far the most common level applied, the statute is upheld if it bears a "reasonable relation to a
legitimate state interest." Id. at 722.
33. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281. Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, spent much time on
how neither the Constitution nor the nine Justices themselves know when a life has become
"worthless." Id. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 283-84 (majority opinion).
35. Id. at 317 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Missouri had already acknowledged that life-sustaining treatment
could be refused; the court only specified that this refusal must be proven
by clear and convincing evidence. 36  Because preponderance of the
evidence is the standard of proof for a "run-of-the-mine [sic] civil
dispute"37 and end of life is "self evident[ly] '38 a more serious issue, this
clear and convincing evidence requirement was only an incidental
restriction on an individual's freedom to refuse life-sustaining treatment.
As a result, the Court did not have to define the state's interest in
preservation of life all that concretely-or even at all-to find either a
substantial interest in avoiding erroneous decisions through a heightened
standard of proof.
The limitations of the Cruzan reasoning with regard to physician-
assisted suicide are readily apparent. This case concerned only an
evidentiary standard, not any individual right to make a decision
conceming the merits of life or death. 39  Furthermore, because Nancy
Cruzan was in a vegetative state, she was not making the decision herself.
40
Finally, the decision here involved the refusal of life-sustaining treatment, a
right long acknowledged by the Court.41 This is quite different from the
proactive administration of substances designed to end life, as physician-
assisted suicide does. As a result of these factual differences, the Cruzan
reasoning, while certainly influential, should not be controlling in situations
where an individual is making for him- or herself the life or death decision
of physician-assisted suicide. As discussed below, these factual differences
were essentially ignored in Washington v. Glucksberg.
C. Washington v. Glucksberg: Where We Are Now, and Where It Went
Wrong
Washington v. Glucksberg concerned a statute which imposed
criminal liability on anyone who knowingly or intentionally aided another
person to commit or attempt suicide.42 Four doctors, who "occasionally




40. Id. at 267.
41. Id. at281.
42. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 706 (1997). Another case, Vacco v. Quill, 521
U.S. 793 (1997), was decided the same day. Vacco concerned a New York statute that provided
criminal prosecution for aiding a suicide. Id. at 796. While the Court similarly found that this
statute did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, Vacco, 521 U.S. at 797, Glucksberg remains
the benchmark for physician-assisted suicide litigation. Therefore, discussion here will be limited
to a discussion of Glucksberg.
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treat[ed] terminally ill, suffering patients," filed suit as a prima facie
challenge.43
The Court framed the question as a constitutional challenge to the
"liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment which extends to
a personal choice by a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to commit
physician-assisted suicide. ''44 Based upon this narrow framing of the issue,
the Court found, throughout history, that Anglo-Americans have
considered it criminal to commit-or to assist-suicide.45  The Court
declined to find a fundamental right to an assisted suicide because of the
copious history demonstrating societal disapproval of suicide itself.
46
Affording the individual's interest in suicide only rational basis scrutiny,
47
the Court balanced this interest against the state's many interests. 48 These
interests included protection of the preservation of life; 49 "protecting the
integrity and ethics of the medical profession; ' 50 "protecting vulnerable
groups-including the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons-from abuse,
neglect, and mistakes;",5' and, protecting against the "slippery slope" from
suicide to involuntary euthanasia.52 In finding that all interests are
"unquestionably important and legitimate," the Court held the law was
rationally related to the state's interests and that the Washington law was
proper.
53
The three areas of the Glucksberg decision that are most pertinent to
this note are as follows: the framing by the Court of the individual interest
at stake; 54 the subsequently determined rational basis review; 55 and, the
"unqualified interest in the preservation of human life."56 By examining
43. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 707.
44. Id. at 708.
45. Id. at710-16.
46. Id. at 728.
47. Id. at 728 n.21.
48. Id. at 734; see also id. at 728 n.20.
49. Id. at 728.
50. Id. at 731.
51. Id.
52. Id at 732; see also id. at 733 n.23. Six state interests were addressed by the Ninth
Circuit: "(1) preserving life; (2) preventing suicide; (3) avoiding the involvement of third parties
and use of arbitrary, unfair, or undue influence; (4) protecting family members and loved ones;
(5) protecting the integrity of the medical profession; and (6) avoiding future movement toward
euthanasia and other abuses." Id. at 728 n.20 (citing Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79
F.3d 790, 816-32 (1996)).
53. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735.
54. Id. at 722.
55. Id. at 728.
56. Id.
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the type of interest the Court found and the type of interest that the Court
perhaps should have found, a proper level of scrutiny can be assumed.
Once a definition of "life" is established, this sets the stage for a new
individual's right versus state's interest balance. The need for a concrete
definition of life becomes readily apparent by examining how the Court
arrived at its "unqualified interest in the preservation of human life"
language and why this designation is not only fallacious, but shows how
the Court avoided its obligation to adequately balance the state's interest
against the individual right.
1. Reformulating the Individual "Right to Die"
The Court carefully set up its Due Process analysis under the guise
that "substantive-due-process cases [require] a 'careful description' of the
asserted fundamental liberty interest. ' 57  Under this rubric, the Court
rejected the Ninth Circuit's framing of "'whether there is a liberty interest
in determining the time and manner of one's death,' or, in other words, 'is
there a right to die?' ' 58 Similarly, the Court rejected Glucksberg's framing
of the liberty interest as "'the right to choose a humane, dignified death'
[or] 'the liberty to shape death.' ' 59  Because the Washington statute
specified "aiding another person to attempt suicide," 60 the Court framed the
liberty interest as whether there is "a right to commit suicide which itself
includes a right to assistance in doing so."' 6 1 By framing the question so
narrowly and, by specifically using the word "suicide, 62 the Court was
able to avoid finding a fundamental interest.63
57. Id. at 721.
58. Id. at 722 (citing Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 799, 801 (1996)).
59. Id. (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 723 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060(l) (1994)).
61. Id.
62. The word "suicide" carries with it the weight of years of morality, religion and culture.
See id. at 716; see also Mark D. Frederick, Physician Assisted Suicide: A Personal Right?, 21
S.U. L. REV. 59 (1994); Kam C. Wong, Whose Life Is It Anyway?, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y &
ETHICS J. 233, 233 n.4 (2006). As an aside, the Bible, a source of many Americans' religious
beliefs, does not strictly condemn suicide. The immorality of suicide stems from a middle-age
proclamation by the Catholic Church; from that time, suicide was seen as "a crime against man
and God." Frederick, supra at 64.
63, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728. A fundamental interest is one that is "objectively 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."' Id. at 720-21 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 503 (1977). Another formulation requires the right to be "so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Id. at 721 (citing Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). A final formulation requires the right to be so implicit
that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed." Id. (citing Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
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This careful construction of the individual interest did not escape the
notice of the concurring Justices. Justice O'Connor (and subsequently
Justice Ginsberg) 64 focused her concurring opinion on the possibility that a
different construction might result in a finding of a liberty interest.
65
Justice Stevens acknowledged that there was still "room for further debate
about the limits that the Constitution places on the power of the States to
punish the practice [of giving aid in dying], 66 and that such a challenge
might be better framed in an "as applied" challenge.67 Justice Stevens also
suggested that in some situations, there may be a stronger liberty interest
than the Court found generally.68 Justice Souter explained that a more
proper analysis might have been accomplished by examining whether there
was a "liberty interest in bodily integrity," 69 and he relied on numerous
examples where such a liberty interest has been found.7° Justice Breyer,
disagreeing with the Court's formulation of the liberty interest, would have
used a formulation which included a "right to die with dignity.",7' From the
concurring opinions, it appears that there was support for finding that a
properly formulated "right to die" or "right to bodily integrity, 72 would be
found as a liberty interest.
2. "Right to Die" as a Liberty Interest
Support for the "right to die" as a liberty interest can also be found by
comparing it to the rights affirmed in abortion jurisprudence. The obvious
parallels between end of life and beginning of life provide only a starting
point.73 References to Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
64. See id. at 789 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
65. See id at 736-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 738 (Stevens, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 739.
68. Id. at 745.
69. Id. at 777.
70. Id. at 777-78.
71. Id. at 790 (Breyer, J., concurring).
72. For ease of discussion, the right in question here will be called a "right to die."
73. For a discussion about how abortion and physician-assisted suicide are legally related,
see Carrie Pailet, Comment, Abortion and Physician Assisted Suicide: Is There a Constitutional
Right to Both?, 8 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 45, 64 (2006) (discussing how "both procedures... rel[y]
on the same legal argument, that to prohibit either choice is a violation of an unspecified,
constitutionally protected, liberty interest that one may make decisions affecting one's own body
free from legal interference").
For a discussion about why abortion and physician-assisted suicide are dissimilar, see Marc
Spindelman, Are the Similarities between a Woman's Right to Choose an Abortion and the
Alleged Right to Assisted Suicide Really Compelling?, 29 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 775, 815-32
(1996) (discussing how there is a distinct difference between personhood in the two cases; that
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v. Casey7 4 as well as Roe v. Wade7 5 figured prominently in every Justices'
opinion in Glucksberg.7 6  The language of Casey, in reaffirming "the
essential holding of Roe v. Wade,",77 provides ample room for a right to die.
Casey held that the Due Process Clause protected many of the rights and
liberties "involv[ed in] the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, and that "[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life."7 9 A right to die fits well within the "defining
one's own concept of existence" language used in Casey.80 Therefore, it is
consistent that the rights accorded to abortion should be extended to
physician-assisted suicide.
Although Roe v. Wade defined abortion as a fundamental right, 81 over
time it has become less clear if the right is "fundamental" or merely a
"liberty interest.' 82 Beginning with Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, the Court proposed that abortion need not be defined as a
fundamental right but could be construed as a "liberty interest protected by
the Due Process Clause. 83 Although this definition was startling at the
time, the language in Casey continued this move away from defining
abortion as a fundamental right, choosing instead to state the following
language: "liberty, or an aspect of bodily integrity, or an exercise in
personal autonomy." 84 In the most recent abortion decision, Gonzales v.
Carhart, the term "fundamental" is used only once, in Justice Ginsberg's
abortion is being redefined as a sex-equality right; and that socially, abortion is seemingly more
acceptable than physician-assisted suicide).
74. Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
75. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
76. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 726-35. Again, by defining the question of the right
as narrowly as the Court did, the Court mitigated the parallels between these areas of
jurisprudence.
77. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
78. Id. at 851.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-56 (1973).
82. Spindelman, supra note 73, at 786 (stating that "[t]he Supreme Court no longer
considers the right to abortion to be a 'fundamental,' 'very fundamental,' or 'limited
fundamental' right... [which] provides an important lesson where the right to assisted suicide is
concerned .. .[that] the most that could be said of any fight to assisted suicide is that it is a
Fourteenth Amendment 'liberty interest.').
83. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989).
84. Spindelman, supra note 73, at 785 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 857 (1992)).
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dissenting opinion.85 The Court in Carhart echoes the language of Casey:
the government may not impose an undue burden, defined as a regulation
of which the "purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion. 86  By lumping liberty interests and
fundamental rights into one category, 87 the Glucksberg Court further
muddles the line between the two.
The obvious similarities between abortion and right to die
jurisprudence make the individual rights accorded in abortion cases an
appropriate standard for right to die cases. Because it seems that abortion
is no longer a "fundamental" right, the appropriate status is that of "liberty
interest." Therefore, a happy medium could be reached by also according
an individual's right to die a "liberty interest" status. Indeed, five of the
Justices on the Glucksberg Court seemed prepared to eschew the Court's
formulation of the individual right, and seemed similarly prepared to define
the right (albeit not in the same terms) as a liberty interest.
It is not clear from the Court's jurisprudence if a fundamental right
and a liberty interest accord the same protection. A number of
commentators have noticed that the Court appears to be using the term
liberty interest as opposed to a fundamental right and are not quite sure
what to make of that.88 As Professor Sunstein noted, "It is unclear whether
the identification of a 'liberty interest' has the same consequence [as a
fundamental right]. 89 It is possible that the term "liberty" is merely being
used to "more closely tie Due Process jurisprudence to the text of the
Constitution," and, therefore, the distinction between the two terms has no
merit.90 However, in Cruzan, the Court used the term "liberty interest" and
referred to the state's interests as "substantial." 91 For argument's sake, this
85. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1647 (2007) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 1626-27 (majority opinion).
87. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). The Court also
acknowledged fundamental and liberty interests in contexts other than an individual's right to die:
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (abortion); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-279 (1990) (right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical
treatment); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (right to bodily integrity); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to marry); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to
have children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to direct the education and
upbringing of one's children); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (same); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to marital privacy and use of contraception). Id. at 720.
88. See Michael P. Allen, The Constitution at the Threshold of Life and Death: A Suggested
Approach to Accommodate an Interest in Life and a Right to Die, 53 AM. U.L. REV. 971, 986
n.64 (2004); Cass R. Sunstein, Essay: The Right to Die, 106 YALE L.J. 1123, 1131 n.30 (1997).
89. Sunstein, supra note 88, at 1131 n.30.
90. Allen, supra note 88, at 986 n.64.
91. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278, 283.
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note conservatively assumes that a "liberty interest" does not merit strict
scrutiny as a fundamental interest, but rather deserves something higher
than a rational basis review. For simplicity's sake, this note will adopt the
language set forth by the Court in San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United
States Olympic Committee that a statute cannot stand if the "incidental
restrictions on . . . freedoms are greater than necessary to further a
substantial government interest., 92 Accordingly, this assumption further
includes that the liberty interest of the right to die is afforded heightened
scrutiny.
3. The State's Interest. An "Unqualified Interest" in Preserving What?
The Glucksberg Court set forth four state interests: protecting the
preservation of life; 93 "protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical
profession; '94 "protecting vulnerable groups-including the poor, the
elderly, and disabled persons-from abuse, neglect, and mistakes, and;" 95
protecting against the "slippery slope" from suicide to involuntary
euthanasia. 96  Commentators have argued that the state's interest in the
preservation of life is arguably the most important of the state's interests
when compared to a right to die. 97 Because each of the above interests
embody many nuanced issues that are themselves deserving of individual
review, this note's discussion is limited to the state's interest in preserving
life.
The Court in Cruzan held that to avoid "quality of life judgments" it
was proper to "simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of
human life."98 In addition to appropriating verbatim Cruzan's "unqualified
interest" standard, 99 the Glucksberg Court also adopted Washington's
assertion that "all persons' lives, from beginning to end, regardless of
physical or mental condition, are under the full protection of the law."100
92. San Francisco Arts & Athetics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 537 (1987).
93. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997).
94. Id. at 73 1.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 732; see also id. at 733 n.23.
97. Allen, supra note 88, at 987; see also Matthew P. Previn, Note, Assisted Suicide and
Religion: Conflicting Conceptions of the Sanctity of Human Life, 84 GEO. L. J. 589 (1996); Eryn
R. Ace, Note, Krishner v. Mciver: Avoiding the Dangers of Assisted Suicide, 32 AKRON L. REV.
723 (1999).
98. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990).
99. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728 (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282).
100. Id. at 729.
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Difficulties arise from this use of the "unqualified interest"
language. 10 1 Although the Glucksberg Court endeavored to support its
assertion of an unqualified interest in the preservation of life, the Court's
analysis suffered from three serious flaws. First, the Glucksberg Court
applied the Cruzan language to a completely different context. The
Washington statute at issue in Glucksberg was not an evidentiary measure
that protected access to a right, as it was in Cruzan, but a direct affront to
an individual's ability to decide when and how they wanted to die. Second,
although the Glucksberg Court cited existing state policies such as
homicide law to support this blanket contention, the Court selectively chose
to ignore state policies that leaned the other way. Third, and most
importantly, in declining to define "life," the Court created an
insurmountable standard. An unqualified interest in an undefined term
could embody almost anything.
The Glucksberg Court appropriated the "unqualified interest"
language and the "quality of life" language without support and without a
similar context. In Cruzan, the Court's biggest fear was making quality of
life judgments. 0 2 But in Cruzan, the Court was at one remove: the issue
there was the appropriate evidentiary standard for refusing medical
treatment, a procedural question. The Court did not have to make a quality
of life decision; that decision was left to the individual. The individual
simply had to prove their desire to refuse treatment with clear and
convincing evidence. In addition, the Cruzan Court's statement of an
unqualified interest in preserving life was essentially dicta. In Glucksberg,
the Court simply adopted the language without any explanation and,
contrary to Cruzan, as a factor key to the central holding. 10 3 Furthermore,
the Glucksberg Court adopted the position first elucidated in Cruzan that
"the States 'may properly decline to make judgments about the 'quality' of
life that a particular individual may enjoy."",10 4  That language was
presented in the context of why Missouri could impose "heightened
evidentiary requirements."' 5 Heightened evidentiary requirements lessen a
court's responsibility to determine which facts are true; they also make the
101. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 88, at 988 (discussing how the unqualified interest makes it
difficult to weigh that interest versus an interest in refusing medical treatment); see also Suzanne
M. Alford, Note, Is Self-Abortion a Fundamental Right?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1011, 1028-29 (2003)
(discussing how the "unqualified interest" in life recognized by the Court provides support for
"proscrib[ing] activities that endanger it, including [physician-assisted suicide]").
102. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282.
103. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728.
104. Id. at 729 (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282).
105. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
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determination more procedural: are the facts such that they prove the issue
clearly and convincingly?
10 6
The Glucksberg Court provided only selective support for its assertion
of an unqualified interest in the preservation of life, by ignoring other areas
that show states qualifying their interest in life. The Court cited the
existence of homicide laws as the quintessential indicator of the state's
interest in preserving life. 10 7  In addition, the Court cited the state's
involuntary commitment provisions for those who attempt to harm
themselves for the proposition that the state is interested in keeping people
from harming themselves. 10 8 The Court also noted that prevention of
suicide "shores up the notion of limits in human relationships," in that it
"reflects the gravity with which we view the decision to take one's own
life."'0 9 The state also has a parens patriae interest" 0 in making sure that
an individual does not make bad choices. While these interests do show
that the state does have an interest in preserving life, this interest is not
unqualified because, as discussed below, there are many ways in which the
states, and even the Constitution, qualify an interest in the preservation of
life.
Justice Brennan, in his Cruzan dissent, points out that if states truly
had an unqualified interest in the preservation of life, there would be
universal health care laws."' This critique remains true today, as
evidenced by the fact that only Massachusetts has implemented universal
health care."
12
Justice Stevens, in his Glucksberg dissent, specifically noted that the
Court has routinely upheld the constitutionality of capital punishment
106. As noted in Justice Brennan's dissent, allowing an "unqualified" interest to inform even
the evidentiary standards would entail the State making a quality choice about the type of
evidence representing an individual's intent, which is akin to making a quality choice about how
the state viewed that individual's life. Id. at 316-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It seems possible
that there may be a logical flaw in the Cruzan language, which further compounds the problem of
the appropriation in Glucksberg.
107. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728-29 ("The interests in the sanctity of life that are represented
by the criminal homicide laws are threatened by one who expresses a willingness to participate in
taking the life of another.") (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 cmt. 5 at 100) (1962)).
108. Id. at 729 n.22 (citing People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 730 (Mich. 1994)).
109. Id.
110. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 315 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 314 n.15.
112. Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Sets Benefits in Universal Health Care Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 2007, available at http:/lwww.nytimes.com/2007/03121lus/21mass.html?scp=l &sq=.
Three other states are contemplating this measure: California, Illinois and Pennsylvania. Kevin
Sack, States' Widening of Health Care Hits Road Blocks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2007, available at
http:llwww.nytimes.com12007112125/us/25health.html?scp=6&sq=.
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statutes.13 If the state's interest in preserving life were truly unqualified
then the state would have an interest in preserving the life of even those
who commit capital crimes. In the capital punishment context, the state's
interest is not to preserve life, but to take life.114 To this day, thirty-six
states, the United States government, and the United States military have
some form of capital punishment statute on their books." 5
Similarly, the Constitution implies that as long as due process is
followed, one may be deprived of life.' 1 6 For example, the Court held in
Gregg v. Georgia that the Constitution did not per se forbid "the sentence
of death for the crime of murder." ' 1 7 The Framers of the Constitution lived
during a time when putting someone to death was a common
punishment." 8 It would seem that if the Constitution truly supported the
contention that the states had an unqualified interest in the preservation of
life, there would be no situation in which someone may be deprived of life,
even if due process were followed.
In declining to define "life" and, specifically, when life ends, the
Court created an insurmountable standard because, an unqualified interest
in an undefined term could embody almost anything. While the word "life"
conveys a certain meaning to everyone, that meaning is not universal and
can mean a variety of things in a variety of circumstances.'19 For example,
in order to be considered "dead" for purposes of "settling estates, closing
bank accounts, selling stocks and bonds, and determining insurance and
pension benefits[, or] providing evidence in court cases," one needs a death
certificate. 120  Filling out a death certificate often involves determining a
clear cause of death,' 2 1 which may take time. It is foolish to think that the
113. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 738 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)).
114. Supporters of the state's unqualified interest combat the presence of capital punishment
statutes by differentiating between those who have been convicted of a crime and those who have
not committed crimes, classified as "innocent life." Previn, supra note 97, at 593 n.2 1. However,
merely by drawing that distinction, the state has shown that it does qualify its interest in
preserving life. While only protecting innocent life may be a justifiable qualification, it is still a
qualification.
115. Death Penalty Information Center, Death Penalty Policy by State,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did= 121 &scid=l 1 (last visited Sept. 29, 2008).
116. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
117. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176.
118. Id. at 177.
119. See discussion infra Part H1.
120. Geoffrey R. Swain, Gloria K. Ward & Paul P. Hartlaub, Editorial, Death Certificates:
Let's Get it Right, 71 AM. FAMILY PHYSICIAN 652 (2005), available at
http://www.aafp.org/afp/20050215/editorials.html.
121. Id.
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state's interest in preserving "life" extends until a death certificate is
completed. On the other end, clinical death is defined as "cardiac arrest
accompanied by apnea and loss of consciousness" but may be, for a time,
reversible. 22 Ostensibly someone in the "reversible" portion of clinical
death is still very much alive. Because there is so much wiggle room in
adopting an unqualified interest in preserving an undefined term, it is hard
to pinpoint the state's exact interest under any circumstances. It is simply
impossible to compare an individual right to something that is so fluid.
In summary, the Glucksberg Court erred in many ways. First, by
narrowly defining the individual right in question to one of suicide, the
Court misframed the individual right. Five Justices were prepared to grant
the individual right in question a liberty interest status and the connection
between physician-assisted suicide jurisprudence and abortion
jurisprudence seem to indicate that the rights in question in both areas
should be afforded the same liberty interest protection. Second, because of
this misframing, the level of scrutiny applied-rational basis review-was
erroneous. Liberty interests should be accorded a heightened scrutiny,
wherein the restrictions must be necessary to meet a state's substantial
interest. Finally, the Court erred in asserting an unqualified interest in the
preservation of life. Not only is the state's interest in preserving life
qualified,1 23 but the lack of a definition for life, and when life ends, makes
it impossible to accurately compare the state's interest in preserving life
with an individual's liberty interest.
II. Defining the End of "Life"
Simply acknowledging that the Supreme Court has avoided its
obligation to seriously balance the state's interest against the individual's
interest does little to resolve how the Court may rectify this problem. A
definitive point at which the Constitution no longer recognizes life would
provide the floor beyond which no state may pursue its interest to preserve
life. When such a floor is set, the Court could undertake a reasoned
balance of the two competing interests.
To be fair, practically any definition for the end of life, as long as it
was logically supportable, would allow for this reasoned balance. The
122. James DuBois, Non-Heart-Beating Organ Donation: A Defense of the Required
Determination of Death, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHIcS 126, 130 (1999).
123. Paul S. Kawai, Comment, Should the Right to Die Be Protected? Physician Assisted
Suicide and Its Potential Effect on Hawai'i, 19 U. HAW. L. REv. 783, 795 (1997). But see Allen,
supra note 88, at 990-92 (suggesting that a state may have a comprehensive interest in life while
taking into account the seemingly paradoxical interest in capital punishment. The author,
however, calls this a qualified "comprehensive interest").
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choice of one particular bright-line rule necessarily excludes other bright-
line rules. 124  The choice of whole brain death is suggested here as a
preeminent definition for several reasons: it provides a definitive point in
time for death; it has established criteria for determining that point in time;
it has precedent and support from both the medical and legal community,
and; it is in accordance with a generally accepted concept of death. Other
definitions lack at least one of these supporting factors.
A. Definition: Life is the Absence of Death
Certainty is prized in law. 125 This is especially true in situations in
which so many legal changes are wrought at the moment when life
ceases.126 The simplest definition contrasts life directly with death, without
necessarily defining death. 127  This definition, although conceptually
gratifying, is more a "know it when I see it' 2 8 definition that suffers from
two major drawbacks.
First, this definition begs the question: the death of what? In biology,
life and death are relative terms. In biology "[c]ells . . . are the
fundamental units of life" and provide the answer to the "question of what
life is.' 129 But whereas a single bacteria, the simplest of all cells, dies when
that cell ceases to function, 13 a multi-cellular human being continues to
live even if a single cell dies. In a single human being, billions of cells die
every hour. 13' Both external and internal forces dictate when a cell dies;
for example, a cell has a limited number of times it can divide before it
124. For an example where the Court has previously established a bright-line rule to the
exclusion of other rules, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). There, the Court adopted the
"one person, one vote" standard, to the exclusion of a number of other reasons. Id. at 558. This
standard was chosen the exclusion of other standards. See, e.g., id. at 622-23 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that division of votes could have occurred on almost any other ground,
such as history or economic interest).
125. Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Defining Life from the Perspective of Death: An Introduction
to the Forced Symmetry Approach, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 41, 43.
126. Id. at44.
127. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/life
(last visited Sept. 29, 2008). ("Ia: the quality that distinguishes a vital and functional being from
a dead body ... c: an organismic state characterized by capacity for metabolism, growth, reaction
to stimuli, and reproduction").
128. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Although
commonly used to refer to an inherent knowledge of what is what, Justice Stewart did effectively
recant the line in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 39-40 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting), calling
such a standard "vague."
129. ESSENTIAL CELL BIOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE
CELL 1 (Bruce Alberts et al. eds., Garland Publishing, Inc. 1998).
130. Id. at 22.
131. Id. at584-85.
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stops dividing and dies. 132 This division is regulated by chemical signals in
the body which tell a cell when to divide, and when it is no longer
needed.133 Thus, from a cellular perspective of an organism, "life" and
"death" may only be defined as a process rather than as a set point in
time. 134  Furthermore, Human Biology posits that the key difference
between humans and other living organisms is the existence of a cultural
heritage. 135 Elucidating criteria of death of a human as opposed to bacteria
when the dividing line is "culture" presents too many variables to
contemplate. Because this definition lacks both a definitive point in time,
as well as criteria to determine that point in time, defining life as the
absence of death is not helpful.
Second, the miracle of modem medicine allows people to continue
living on machinery that, if removed, would result in either starvation or
asphyxiation. 3 6 While medicine is "the science and art [of] dealing with
the maintenance of health and the prevention, alleviation, or cure of
disease,"'137 it is this ability to maintain health through aiding natural means
or through artificial means, which allows human beings to lengthen their
own lives.' 38 The concept of extending life by artificial means is becoming
an issue of great concern. 139 There are now machines that will pump blood
and supply oxygen, two functions that can be performed without the body's
inherent ability to perform either. 140 Because it is now possible to be "not
dead" with the aid of a machine, this adds additional problems to
determining the point in time at which one is "dead."
Accepting the general proposition that life is the absence of death, life
can be defined based upon the point life ceases, as opposed to searching for
an affirmative definition of life. Anything before that point is life, anything
after that point is death. Unfortunately, biology, which embraces a process
132. Id. at 584.
133. Id. at 585.
134. Smolensky, supra note 125, at 43.
135. HUMAN BIOLOGY 2 (Sylvia S. Madder ed., McGraw-Hill 7th ed. 2002) (1988).
136. Yen-Yuan Chen, Alfred F. Connors, Jr. & Allan Garland, Effect of Decisions to
Withhold Life Support on Prolonged Survival, 133 CHEST 1312 (2008).
137. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
medicine (last visited Sept. 29, 2008).
138. See Melissa Fusco, World Faces Challenge as Technologies Lengthen Life
Expectancies, Biologist Says, STANFORD NEWS SERVICE, March 1, 2006, http://news-
service.stanford.edu/news/2006/march t/atulja-030106.html.
139. See id; see also Previn, supra note 97, at 601; Ace, supra note 97, at 738 n.85.
140. Chen, supra note 136.
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approach to life, 14 1 is ill-suited to this analysis. We must turn to other
fields in search of a definition of death.
B. Definition: Death as the Opposite of Viability
One of the most pertinent areas of law defining life, and certainly one
most compared to physician-assisted suicide, is the area of abortion. 142 The
abortion debate centers predominantly at the point at which a fetus
becomes a person and, therefore, subject to the protection of the
Constitution. 143  The Court has chosen to identify this transitional point
from fetus to person as the point of viability. 144 Viability is commonly held
to be the point at which a fetus can survive on his own outside the mother's
body. 145  Viability is presumed at twenty-four weeks after conception,
although, the rate of survival of babies born before the twenty-fourth week
continues to improve with advances in medical science. 146 This suggests
that viability as a defining point is becoming increasingly irrelevant
because a fetus "can" be kept alive, even if it could not stay alive on its
own. 147  Generally speaking, a fetus is unable to stay alive outside the
mother's body before five-and-a-half months (approximately twenty-two
weeks) even with medical aid because the lungs are not developed enough
to function. 148 Therefore, despite being tied to a specific time, the viability
standard is losing the preciseness it once had.
149
Extrapolating viability lessons to end of life determinations is
difficult. First, unlike viability's presumption that a fetus can survive at
twenty-four weeks, there is no definitive temporal point which marks for
141. Smolensky, supra note 125, at 43.
142. See Spindelman, supra note 73, at 815-21; see also Pailet, supra note 73.
143. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160-63 (1973).
144. Id. at 163.
145. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 US 490, 515-516 (1989) (viability presumed
at twenty weeks); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992) (viability
presumed when there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the
womb, so that the independent existence of the second life can in reason and in all fairness be the
object of state protection that now overrides the rights of the woman).
146. Clare Dyer, Experts Clash as Committee Debates Reducing 24 Week Abortion Limit,
335 BRIT. MED. J. 781, 789 (2007).
147. Richard Lyus, Abortion Limit Debate: Viability is Probably Irrelevant, 335 BRIT. MED.
J. 945, 953 (2007).
148. LANGMAN'S MEDICAL EMBRYOLOGY 197-200 (T.W. Sadler ed., Lippincott Williams &
Wilkins 10th ed. 2006) (1963) (stating that sufficient lung development occurs during months six
and seven).
149. For a discussion on alternate means of defining fetal life, see Smolensky, supra note
125, at 72 (suggesting that a better identifier of fetal life is "brain birth," the point at which
electical activity in the brain begins).
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all people the time at which the human body ceases to survive. Second, a
particular organ failure does not present the same problems in an elderly
person as it does in a fetus. At the end of life, there is no question that
organs are developed enough to possess the capacity, if not the ability, to
function. Through the aid of medical machines, the actions of almost every
major organ group can be replicated. 50 Applying viability to end of life
provides neither a definitive end point, nor criteria for determining that end
point.
C. Definition: Death as Whole Brain Death-A Workable Solution
There is, however, some hope. Because the medical community is
concerned with "the science and art [of] dealing with the maintenance of
health and the prevention, alleviation, or cure of disease,"1 5 1 the medical
community had to establish a point in time in which a person was declared
"dead."1 52  The medical community developed a variety of various
methodologies by which doctors determined death from the early 1900s
through the late twentieth century.1 53 Originally considering death to occur
at the time of cardio-pulmonary cessation,1 54 doctors realized that it was
possible to have a heartbeat with no brainwave function and vice versa.
155
In the 1980s, struggling with the variations of the human body, the
medical community called for a universal definition of death that embodied
"the loss of integrative unity of the organism as a whole."' 156 In 1981, the
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research ("Commission") proposed the
Uniform Determination of Death. 157  The Commission, consisting of
doctors, lawyers and ethicists, defined death as occurring when "[a]n
individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory
and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the
entire brain, including the brainstem, is dead. A determination of death
150. Wendy L. Schoen, Note, Conflict in the Parameters of Defining Life and Death in
Missouri Statutes, 16 AM. J. L. & MED. 555, 556 (1990) (stating that there are machines that can
perform the actions of the heart and lungs).
151. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
medicine (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
152. Schoen, supra note 150, at 567.
153. Id. at 566-67.
154. Smolensky, supra note 125, at 46.
155. Schoen, supra note 150, at 567.
156. Ari Robin Joffe, M.D., The Neurological Determination of Death: What Does it Really
Mean?, 23 ISSUES L. & MED. 119, 120 (2007).
157. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 16.
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must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards."' 58  The
entire brain is responsible for the integrated functioning of all the organs
and, therefore, a definition that required whole brain death marked the
point at which the body could no longer regulate or integrate any of its
systems.' 59 The Commission especially liked the term "whole brain"
because it "clariflied] the understanding of death that enjoys near universal
acceptance in our society. 16 ° Overall, the Commission decided that whole
brain death was the most appropriate standard 61 because it allowed death
to be defined as a single phenomenon1 62 for the organism as a whole, 163 was
not a radical new development in the medical front, 164 could be uniformly
applied, 165 and was adaptable to advances in diagnosis techniques. 166 The
Commission's definition amalgamated several disparate definitions used in
the United States. 167 These definitions had been promulgated by individual
state legislatures, the American Medical Association, and the American Bar
Association. 168 The Uniform Determination of Death is now applied in
some form in all fifty states. 169 Although suggested for "all jurisdictions of
the United States,"' 170 federal entities have yet to adopt its framework.
171
158. Id. at 2.
159. Id. at 32-37.
160. Id. at 36.
161. Other standards contemplated, but eventually rejected by the Commission, included
higher brain death, defined as "the psychological functions which make consciousness, thought
and feeling possible," and other non-brain related definitions, such as the more traditional
cessation of cardio-pulmonary function. Id. at 38, 41.
162. Id. at 57.
163. Id. at 58.
164. Id. at 58. Brain death as a form of death had been acknowledged since the 1960s. See
Smolensky, supra note 125, at 47.
165. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 16, at 60.
166. Id. at 61.
167. Id. at 61-69.
168. The American Bar Association defined death as "a human body, with irreversible
cessation of total brain function, according to usual and customary standards of medical practice,
shall be considered dead." Id. at 64. The American Medical Association had adopted a form of
the "either or" test proposed in the final Uniform Determination of Death, although with
extensive provisions that limited liability from state action. Id. at 66.
169. Smolensky, supra note 125, at 47; see also id. at 47 n.24 ("Some states adopted the
UDDA [Uniform Determination of Death Act] by statute and others adopted it via case law."). A
few states, notably New Jersey and New York, have built in exceptions for religious beliefs. See
id. at 47-49.
170. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 16, at 2.
171. See David Powner, Michael Hemandez & Terry Rives, Variability Among Hospital
Policies for Determining Brain Death in Adults, 32 CRIT. CARE MED. 1284, 1284 (2004) (stating
that brain death is the standard used for organ donation).
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On a practical level, the medical community has developed criteria for
determining whole brain death.17 2 One such set of criteria requires that:
(1) The cause of the neurological state must be known
unequivocally, and must be known to be irreversible. (2) There
must be no medical or anatomic conditions that could confound the
determination .... (3) [Whole brain death can only be pronounced
at] a core temperature of 97.7 'F (36.5 °C) as hypothermia can inhibit
brain function, including the brainstem. (4) [Whole brain death can
only be pronounced when t]he systolic blood pressure [is]
maintained >90 mm Hg. (5) There must be no evidence of drug
intoxication, poisoning or paralysis. 173
In addition, clinical tests require existence of a coma, absence of
brainstem reflexes, and presence of apnea, which is defined as absence of
motor response. 174
In summary, by defining the end of life as the point of whole brain
death, many important considerations are addressed. This is a specific
point in time at which a person is deemed "dead." In addition, the medical
community has an established protocol for establishing when whole brain
death has occurred. Whole brain death conforms to both the medical and
legal definitions of death used in all fifty states, as well as our social
perceptions of "death."' 175  Whole brain death is the most certain and
172. Id. at 1285. As suggested in the article, there is no universal standard required of all
medical institutions. Id. at 1284. Although the American Academy of Neurology published
guidelines in 1995, "they are an informal model against which institutional policies" are created. Id.
173. Sandra Nathan & David Greer, Brain Death, 25 SEMINARS IN ANESTHESIA,
PERIOPERATIVE MED. & PAIN 225, 226 (2006).
174. Id.
175. Another form of death contemplated but ultimately rejected by the Commission is higher
brain death. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 16, at 38-41. In Re Quinlan figured
prominently in the President's Commission's analysis of whether higher brain function should be
the appropriate measure. See id. at 18, 40, 61. However, the Commission noted that someone
who was able to breath on their own, much as Karen Quinlan could do, was not the same as a
corpse. Id. at 40.
Higher brain death results in loss of emotion, consciousness and cognition and occurs more
easily than damage to the more resilient brainstem. Anna Schlotzhauer & Bryan Liang,
Definitions and Implications of Death, 16 HEMATOL. ONCOL. CLIN. N. AM. 1397, 1399 (2002).
Proponents of a higher brain death standard argue that this takes into account the "personness" of
a person. Id. at 1400. But because there is no full definition of "personness," a corresponding
definition using higher brain death cannot be established. Id. Higher brain death is not as easy to
ascertain as whole brain death, and irreversibility can only be established after "3 months to I
year, when the hemispheres of the higher brain show clear degeneration." Id.
As a society, we do not easily accept the possibility that someone may have lost their
personness. The infamous Terri Schiavo debacle is a perfect example. Terri's husband and
parents battled for control over whether to remove her feeding tube. The nation responded on an
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supportable definition of death developed thus far; 7 6 and it is this
definition that the Supreme Court should adopt as marking the end of life.
III. How a Definition of Life Could Change the
Washington v. Glucksberg Analysis
Physician-assisted suicide jurisprudence would change if the Supreme
Court were to adopt whole brain death as the point at which a person's life
ends and, therefore, when the state's interest in preserving that life ends.
As this note discussed in Part I, there were three areas where the
Glucksberg Court provided an improperly cursory analysis. These areas
are (1) the framing of the individual interest in question, (2) the
subsequently determined level of scrutiny, and (3) the poorly defined
state's unqualified interest in the preservation of life. By reevaluating the
individual's right, affording the right a heightened scrutiny, and refraining
the state's interest in preserving life as one that ends at whole brain death, it
is possible to arrive at a different outcome.
A. Application in a Constrained Hypothetical
To fully explore this hypothetical reexamination of Glucksberg, four
assumptions are made. First, the plaintiffs in this hypothetical case are
unprecedented level, all claiming that the removal of the tube was a cruel punishment. See
generally Mary Coombs, Schiavo: The Road Not Taken, 61 U. MIAMI L. REv. 539 (2007). When
it was later discovered that she had no functioning brain matter other than her brainstem, people,
in hindsight, appeared more willing to accept that her death was "okay." See id. at 541 n.8; see
also Bryan Hilliard, The Politics of Palliative Care and the Ethical Boundaries of Medicine:
Gonzales v. Oregon as a Cautionary Tale, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 158, 165 (2007) ("The culture
of life constitutes a "belief system that starts at conception and ends at Terri Schiavo, with
something of a detour around the death penalty.").
176. Even this standard has been subject to much scrutiny, as doctors have since discovered
that the integrative unity can be decentralized, allowing for the body to continue "living" even if
key organ groups such as the brain or respiratory systems cease to function. Joffe, supra note
156, at 121.
One of the key criticisms against the Uniform Definition of Death is its failure to take into
account that "the legal definition of irreversibility [of death] should remain vague" to better
reconcile with an "event that can be understood to be the occurrence of death" on a religious
level. DuBois, supra note 122, at 127, 132; see also Smolensky, supra note 125, at 47-49
(discussing the religious exceptions to the Uniform Determination of Death adopted by New
Jersey and New York which allow death to be defined purely by cardiopulmonary cessation
where religion forbids a neurological determination, affording death pronouncement decisions to
either the attending physician or hospital). It is this ability which promotes an organism to a
person, as distinct from merely an organism of cells. Joffe, supra note 156, at 122; see also
James J. McCartney, Embryonic Stem Cell Research and Respect for Human Life: Philosophical
and Legal Reflections, 65 ALB. L. REv. 597, 614 (2002) ("[W]hat constitutes being human [being
a person] is beyond the competence of science."). In essence, a person is the sum of both their
organic body and their capacity for consciousness.
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terminally ill, capable patients. Definitions of "terminally ill" and
"capable" are most easily drawn from the Oregon Death with Dignity
Act. 177 Terminal disease is defined as "a disease that is incurable and 'will,
within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six months."",1
78
A "capable" person has "the ability to make and communicate health care
decisions to health care providers, including communication through a
person familiar with the patient's manner of communicating if those
persons are available.' 79 The limitation to terminally ill, capable patients
serves a two-fold purpose: it presents a situation in which, similar to the
situation in Glucksberg, the timeline of the life in question is measurable
and of short duration; and, there is no question about the intent or interest
of the person in question, as there might be with someone in a persistent
vegetative state, which avoids the possibility of "involuntary
euthanasia."' 80
The second assumption concerns the individual interest. As discussed
above, the individual interest at issue in physician-assisted suicide cases is
properly defined as a liberty interest, as suggested by the five concurring
Justices in Glucksberg. This assumption is further based upon both the
legal links between abortion-in light of its dwindling protection-and the
fact that other interests, such as bodily integrity and right to refuse medical
treatment, are accorded a "liberty interest" status.
The third assumption flows from the second; namely, because the
individual right in question is a liberty interest, a heightened scrutiny level
should be applied. In order to survive review under this level of scrutiny,
the statute in question must be necessary to meet a substantial state interest.
The fourth and final assumption provides that life ends at whole brain
death.
The first three assumptions establish the individual interest side of the
heightened scrutiny balance: a terminally ill, capable patient has a liberty
interest in choosing a right to die. How defining life at whole brain death
affects the state's interests presented in Glucksberg presents a more
177. OR. REV. STAT. §§127.800-.897 (2005). In 1994, Oregon passed, and then re-passed
again in 1997 its Death with Dignity Act, becoming the one and only state that allows physician-
assisted suicide. See Hilliard, supra note 175, at 160. Subject to very exacting procedures, a
physician in Oregon could prescribe controlled substances to "terminally ill, competent, adult
patients." See id.
178. Glen R. McMurry, Comment, An Unconstitutional Death: The Oregon Death with
Dignity Act's Prohibition Against Self-Administered Lethal Injunction, 32 DAYTON L. REV. 441,
443 (2007) (citing OR. REV. STAT. §127.800(12) (2005)).
179. Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. §127.800(3) (2005)).
180. Lawrence Solum, Ronald Dworkin & John Finnis, The Fifth Annual Fritz B. Burns
Lecture: Euthanasia, Morality and the Law, 30 LoY. L.A. L. Rev. 1465, 1475 (1997).
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nuanced examination. In order to survive the heightened scrutiny
suggested by the liberty interest at stake, the state interest of preservation of
life must now be a substantial, and not merely legitimate, as required in
Glucks berg. 8'
As soon as an end point to life is definitively determined, this is
arguably no longer the overarching and overreaching state's interest as
discussed in Glucksberg. This statement is contingent upon the underlying
assumptions that because the state's interest cannot continue in perpetuity,
an individual's right to choose when and how he or she dies at some point
outweighs the state's interest.' 82
B. A Definition of Life Relieves Internal Inconsistencies of State's
Interests
Critics might suggest that defining the end of life at brain death does
little to change the unqualified nature of the state's interest; instead, it
merely provides an end point for that interest. In essence, the state can
claim a full and unqualified interest until that point at which the individual
is "dead." The state's unqualified interest cannot continue in full force in
perpetuity, or even up to the point of whole brain death, because to allow
the state such unilateral control over an individual's decision to die is
incongruous with the whole idea of balancing rights. In both Cruzan and
Glucksberg, the Court made much of the fact that states have laws
prohibiting homicide. 183 Yet states have differing levels of punishment for
homicides, depending on the circumstances of the death and the intent of
the perpetrator.' 84 The state's interest in life and death is inevitably on a
sliding scale. Therefore, if at some point in time the state's interest in an
individual's life ends, then it seems to logically follow that, with regard to
physician-assisted suicide, the state's unqualified interest in preserving life
lessens as that individual approaches his or her death. In the end, the
state's interest depends on the temporal nature of the individual's situation.
Is a prohibition on physician-assisted suicide necessary to a substantial
state interest? Prevention of death is necessary if the state's interest in
181. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
182. The New Jersey Supreme Court assumed as much when it said, "Ultimately there comes
a point at which the individual's rights overcome the State interest." In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647, 664 (N.J. 1976). Although it is important to point out that the New Jersey Supreme Court
prefaced their decision on a right to privacy, this idea still holds that the strength of the state's
interest lessens as an individual moves closer to death.
183. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990); Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 710.
184. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.1-210.4 (1962) (dividing homicide into murder,
manslaughter, and negligent homicide).
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preserving that life is substantial. In the case of our hypothetical terminally
ill, capable patient, this determination rests on an examination of whether
the state's interest in preserving the life of someone who is going to die in
six months is substantial. Arguably, the state's interest is no longer
substantial. Here is a person who is unlikely to contribute to society and
who is likely to be in grave amounts of pain for the remainder of his or her
days. In addition, an individual's right to die arguably gets stronger the
closer that individual comes to death. "Death will be different for each of
us." 85 The state's parens patriae interest weakens as well, because the
right choice for the individual who both knows and understands that he or
she is on death's door "is a deeply personal decision of obvious and
overwhelming finality."' 86  When a person is going to die within six
months, the fact that he or she chooses to die a little sooner is not
necessarily a bad choice, and not one from which the state need protect the
individual. The Court's fear of making a quality of life judgment is a moot
point because the Court is not making the decision to end the person's
life-the patient is.
C. Moving Away From a Constrained Hypothetical
This analysis shows that for a terminally ill, capable patient, the state's
interest in preserving his or her life for six months is not substantial enough
to uphold a prohibition on the individual's right to die. Moving away from
these very constrained assumptions would change the analysis. For
example, how would the analysis change if the prognosis were a year?
Two years? Arguably, the state's interest might be substantial enough to
outweigh the individual interest. Or, for example, what if the person was in
a persistent vegetative state? In that case, someone other than the
individual would ostensibly be providing the individual's interest. That
individual does not have the same knowledge and understanding that the
hypothetical person here does, and the Court's fear of having to make
quality of life decisions becomes more real.
These additional hypotheticals show that defining the end of life as
whole brain death will not result in an automatic right of all people to
physician-assisted suicide, and there are still many questions which remain
unanswered. However, affording an individual's right to die a liberty
interest status, and examining the state's interest in preserving life when the
individual is both capable of making his or her own decisions and six
185. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
186. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
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months away from death, illustrates that it is possible for the individual
interest to prevail.
Conclusion
This note has endeavored to explain why the Glucksberg Court, in
creating an unqualified interest in life, and by refusing to define life,
assumed its eventual conclusion that an individual has no right to suicide.
After examining the errors of the Court in its framing of the individual right
and the subsequently determined level of scrutiny, as well as its
misappropriation of the "unqualified interest" language from Cruzan and
lack of definition of "life," this note attempted to suggest remedies to those
errors. Although any definition of life would help, the definition of whole-
brain death provided by the Uniform Determination of Death provides a
workable solution. Whole brain death is a definitive point in time that is
determined by established criteria, supported by the medical and legal
communities, and conforms to society's conception of death. By
redefining the individual's interest as a liberty interest and creating a
definition of life, a more nuanced analysis can be established. The facts of
the Glucksberg case show that under this more nuanced analysis a different
result would be reached; under other circumstances, however, the question
still remains open.
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